References 

[1] Levitt, B., March, J.G. Organizational learning. Ann Rev Socio. 14: 319-340 (1988).

[2] Delios, A., Henisz, W.J. Political hazards, experience, and sequential entry strategies: the international expassion of Japanese firms 1980-1998. Int Manage J 24:1153-1164 (2003).

[3] Schlag, K. Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedlly rational approach to multi-armed bandits. J Econ Theory 78:130-156 (1998).

[4] Vilone, D., Ramasco, J.J., Sánchez, A., San Miguel, M. Social and strategic imitation: the way to consensus. Sci. Rep 2, 686; DOI: 10.1038/srep00686 (2012).

[5] Vega-Redondo, F. Economics and the Theory of Games; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2003.

[6] Luthi, L., Pestelacci, E., Tomassini, M. Cooperation and community structure in social networks. Physica A 387, 955-966 (2008).

[7] Skyrms, B. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2004.

[8] Roca, C.P., Cuesta, J.A., Sánchez, A. Evolutionary Game theory: temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics. Phys. Life Rev. 6, 208-249 (2009).

[9] Tomassini, M., Pestelacci, E. Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks. Games 1, 242-261 (2010).

[10] Scott, J. Social Network Analysis. SAGE Publications, 2012.

[11] Wasserman, S., Faust, K. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge University Press, 1994.

[12] Zhang, P., Peeta, S., Friesz, T. Dynamic Game Theoretic Model of Multi-Layer Infrastructure Networks. Netw Spat Econ 5, 147-178 (2005).

[13] Kivelä, M., Arenas, A., Barthelemy, M., Gleeson, J.P., Moreno, Y., Porter, M.A. Multilayer Networks	arXiv:1309.7233 J. Complex Netw. 2(3): 203-271 (2014).

[14] Wang, Z. , Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games. Sci. Rep. 3, 1183 (2013).

[15] Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation. Sci. Rep. 3, 2470 (2013).

[16] Jiang, L.-L., Perc, M. Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups. Sci. Rep. 3, 2483 (2013).

[17] Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviour. New J. Phys. 15, 053010 (2013).

[18] Wang Z.,Wang L, Perc M. Degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the evolution of cooperation. Phys. Rev. E 89, 052813 (2014).

[19] Granovetter, M. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. J. Am. Soc. 83, 1420-1443 (1978).

[20] Centola, D., Eguíluz, V. M., Macy, M.W. Cascade Dynamics of Complex Propagation. Physica  A 374, 449-456 (2007).

[21] González-Avella, J.C.,  Eguíluz, V.M.,  Marsili, M., Vega-Redondo, F., San Miguel, M. Threshold learning dynamics in social networks. PLoS ONE 6 (5), e20207 (2011).

[22] Suchecki, K., Eguíluz, V. M., San Miguel, M. Voter model dynamics in complex networks: Role of dimensionality. Phys. Rev. E} 72, 036132(1-8) (2005).

[23] Ramsey FP Truth and probability in Ramsey, 1931. In Braithwaite RB (ed) The foundation of mathematics and other logical essays, Chapter VII. Kegan, Paul, trench $\&$ Co., London; Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 156-198. (1926).

[24] Cabrales, A., Uriarte, J.R. Doubts and Equilibria. J Evol Econ 23, 783-810 (2013).

[25] Gracia-Lázaro, C., Ferrera, A., Ruiz,  G., Tarancón, A.,  Cuesta, J.A., Moreno, Y.,  Sánchez, A. Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner's Dilemma, PNAS (USA) 109, 12922-12926 (2012)

[26] Grujić, J., Fosco, C.,  Araujo, L., Cuesta, J.A., Sánchez A. Social experiments in the mesoscale: Humans playing a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma PLoS ONE  5 (11), e13749 (2010).

[27] Grujić, J., Gracia-Lázaro, C.,  Traulsen, A., Milinski, M., Semmann, D.,  Cuesta J.A., Moreno, Y., Sánchez A. A meta-analysis of spatial Prisoner's Dilemma experiments: Conditional cooperation and payoff irrelevance Sci. Rep. 4, 4615 (2014).

[28] Vilone, D., Ramasco, J.J., Sánchez, A., San Miguel, M. Social imitation vs strategic choice, or consensus vs cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma. Physical Review E 90, 022810 (2014).

[29] Holley, R., Liggett, T.M.  Ergodic theorems for weakly interacting infinite systems and the Voter Model. Ann. Probab. 3, 643-663 (1975).

[30] Nowak, M.A.,May, R.M. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359, 826-829. (1992).

[31] Kandori, M., Mailath, G., Rob, R. Learning, mutation, and long-run equilibria in games. Econometrica  61, 29-56. (1993).

[32] Ellison, G. Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61, 1047-1071 (1993).