Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez
Author-Email: carmelor@ccee.ucm.es
Author-Person: pro169
Author-Workplace-Name: Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE), Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain)
Title: Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers
Abstract: We analyze strategy-proof rules that select sets of alternatives based on voters’ preferences over those sets. 
	Sets of alternatives represent social choices pending a final resolution and voters are expected utility 
	maximizers that assign probabilities to alternatives within each set using Bayesian updating from a common prior 
	probability assessment. If there are at least three alternatives, then, for generic priors, only dictatorial 
	rules are strategy-proof and unanimous. However, when the prior probability assessment assigns equal probability 
	to all alternatives, strategyproofness also permits rules that select the set of best elements determined by two 
	fixed voters.
Classification-JEL: D71, D82.
Keywords: Strategy-Proofness; Social Choice Functions over Sets; Cardinal Decision Schemes.
Length: 19 pages 
Creation-Date: 2025
Number: 2025-07
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doicae2507.txt
File-URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/126067
File-Format: Application/html
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:2507