Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez
Author-Email: carmelor@ccee.ucm.es
Author-Person: pro169
Author-Workplace-Name: Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE), Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain)
Title: Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single-Peaked Preferences
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice correspondences (SCCs) –mappings from preference profiles to sets 
	of alternatives– when individuals are endowed with single-peaked preferences over alternatives. We interpret 
	the selected sets of alternatives as the basis for lotteries that determine the final social choice, and consider 
	that agents’ preferences over sets are consistent with Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating from an 
	initial probability assessment over the full set of alternatives. We exploit the relation between SCCs and 
	probabilistic decision schemes –mappings from preference profiles to lotteries over alternatives–, to characterize 
	the family of SCCs that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity for arbitrary initial probability assessments. We 
	extend the analysis to multi-dimensional convex spaces of alternatives under the uniform initial probability 
	assessment.
Classification-JEL: C71, D71.
Keywords: Strategy-Proofness; Single-Peaked Preferences; Social Choice Correspondences.
Length: 27 pages 
Creation-Date: 2025
Number: 2025-06
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doicae2506.txt
File-URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/105005
File-Format: Application/html
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:2506