Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
Author-Email: carmelor@ccee.ucm.es
Author-Person: pro169
Author-Workplace-Name: Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE), Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain)
Title: Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single Peaked Preferences
Abstract: We examine social choice correspondences (SCCs) -mappings from preference profiles to sets of alternatives- that satisfy strategy-proofness 
	and unanimity when individuals are endowed with single-peaked preferences over alternatives, preferences over sets are consistent with Expected 
	Utility Theory, uniform prior probabilities, and Bayesian Updating. Leveraging the relation between SCCs and probabilistic decision schemes -mappings 
	from preference profiles to lotteries over alternatives- we extend the results by Ingalagavi and Sadhukhan (2023, Journal of Mathematical Economics 109, 
	102912). In one-dimensional spaces of alternatives, only the union of two single-valued strategy-proof SCCs satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity. 
	In multi-dimensional convex spaces of alternatives, only unions of up to two dictatorships satisfy both properties.
Classification-JEL: C71, C78, D71.
Keywords: Strategy-Proofness; Single-Peaked Preferences; Social Choice Correspondences.
Length: 18 pages 
Creation-Date: 2024
Number: 2024-02
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doicae2402.txt
File-URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/105005
File-Format: Application/html
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:2402