Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
Author-Email: carmelor@ccee.ucm.es
Author-Workplace-Name: Universidad Complutense de Madrid and ICAE (Spain).
Title: Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof Pairwise Exchange
Abstract: We analyze centralized non-monetary markets for indivisible objects through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We 
	characterize a family of do- mains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) such that there exist pairwise exchange rules that satisfy individual 
	rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Minimal reversal domains are maximal rich domains for individual rationality, efficiency, and 
	strategy- proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible 
	objects coincide with such common rank- ing but for a specific pair of objects.
Classification-JEL: C71, C78, D71, D78.
Keywords: Pairwise Exchange; Individual Rationality; Constrained Efficiency; Strategy-Proofness; Maximal Domain.
Length: 19 pages 
Creation-Date: 2021-11
Number: 2021-10
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doicae2110.txt
File-URL: https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/68905/1/2110.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:2110