Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Tan Ngoc Vu
Author-Workplace-Name: Business and Economics Research Group Ho Chi Minh City Open University, Vietnam.
Author-Name: Duc Hong Vo
Author-Workplace-Name: Business and Economics Research Group Ho Chi Minh City Open University, Vietnam.
Author-Name:
 Michael McAleer
Author-Workplace-Name:
 Department of Quantitative Finance National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan and Econometric Institute Erasmus School of 
	Economics Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands and Department of Quantitative Economics Complutense University of 
	Madrid, Spain And Institute of Advanced Sciences Yokohama National University, Japan.
Title: Rent seeking for export licenses: Application to the Vietnam rice market
Abstract: The paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with an application to Vietnam rice exports. Firms can lobby 
	for export restrictions or for free trade. Innovation is introduced as a cost-reducing technology. The analysis focuses on the innovation incentives of 
	the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of lobbying incentives. The analysis shows that firms lobbying for export restrictions 
	may have lower incentives to adopt technological innovations under export restrictions than under free trade. The findings can help to identify 
	economic inefficiency when the political elites use export restrictions to seek rents.
Classification-JEL: D72, G1, L12, O13, Q55.
Keywords: Trade restrictions, Export licenses, Innovation, Monopoly, Rent seeking; Free trade, Economic development.
Length: 35 pages 
Creation-Date: 2019-03
Number: 2019-13
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doicae1913.txt
File-URL: https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/54771/1/1913.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:1913