Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Antonio Cabrales 
Author-Email: antonio.cabrales@uc3m.es 
Author-Person: pca5 
Author-Workplace-Name: Departamento de Economía (Department of Economics), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and CEPR
Author-Name: Haydée Lugo
Author-Email: hlugo@ccee.ucm.es
Author-Person: plu129 
Author-Homepage: https://www.ucm.es/fundamentos-analisis-economico2/lugo-arocha,-haydee
Author-Workplace-Name: Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II (Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II), Facultad 
	de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales (Faculty of Economics and Business), Universidad Complutense de 
	Madrid
Author-Workplace-Homepage: https://www.ucm.es/fundamentos-analisis-economico2
Title: An impure public good model with lotteries in large grou
Abstract: We analyze the efect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as 
	populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given 
	by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions 
	converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general 
	they do not yield First-best levels.
Classification-JEL: D64, H21, H41
Keywords: Lotteries, Public good, Warm glow, Eficiency. 
Length: 14 pages 
Creation-Date: 2011 
Number: 2011-05
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doicae1105.txt
File-URL: https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/12474/1/1105.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:1105