Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ester Camiña Centeno
Author-Email: ecaminac@ccee.ucm.es
Author-Homepage: https://www.ucm.es/fundamentos-analisis-economico2/camina-centeno,-ester
Author-Workplace-Name: Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II. Fac. Ciencias Económicas. Universidad
	Complutense
Author-Workplace-Homepage: https://www.ucm.es/fundamentos-analisis-economico2
Title: Some results on stability concepts for matching models
Abstract: We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one
	matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller
	owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the
	non-existence of unsatis…ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure
	in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.
Classification-JEL: C71, C78.
Keywords: Matching, Assignment, Stability.
Length: pages 12 
Creation-Date: 2010 
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doicae1004.txt
File-URL: https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/11835/1/1004.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:1004