Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Luis C. Corchón
Author-Workplace-Name: Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
Title: A note on Lindahl equilibria and incentive comparatibility 
Abstract: We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a 
	Nash equilibrium (N.E.) in a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. are L.E., but just those for which the production of the public 
	good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and Strong Equilibria coincide. However if the supply function is continuously differentiable, 
	L.E. is never a N.E. We end the paper with some general comments about the nature of the incentive problem.

Keywords: Lindahl equilibria, Nash equilibrium.

Length: 16 pages 
Creation-Date: 1988 
Number: 88-03  
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doctra88-03.txt	 
File-URL: https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/23117/1/8803.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doctra:88-03