Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: John Malowny
Author-Workplace-Name: The Plymouth Business School 
Title: Lies and layoffs. Asymmetric information and unemployment equilibrium 
Abstract: Implicit contracts were initially seen as a form of insurance. Workers bought a less variable wage 
	at the expense of a slightly lower average wage. But as long as this idea of implicit contracts 
	persisted, they could do little to explain unemployment. A risk-averse worker is unlikely to buy a 
	steadier wage if it is at the increased risk of losing his job. He might do so if the disutility of 
	labour or the level of unemployment benefit were high enough, but in such cases we are effectively 
	back with the classical version of unemployment.

Keywords: Contratos implícitos, Salario, Desempleo.

Length: 23 pages 
Creation-Date: 1987 
Number: 87-26 
X-File-Ref: http://america.sim.ucm.es/repec/ucm/ref/doctra87-26.txt	 
File-URL: https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/21542/1/8726.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:ucm:doctra:87-26